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Summary  findings
Actual and potential competition is a powerful source of  developing countries, they test these hypotheses and find
discipline on the pricing behavior of firms with market  that the hypotheses cannot be rejected by the data. For
power. Hoekman,  Kee, and Olarreaga develop a simple  example, although Indonesia and Italy impose the same
model that shows that the effects of new entry and  number of regulations on the entry of new firms, the
import competition  on industry price-cost markups  effect of the regulations on manufacturing markups is 20
depend on country size.  percent greater in Italy because of its larger size.
The authors predicted that barriers to domestic entry  Similarly, while Chile and Zimbabwe have the same
would have a stronger anti-competitive effect in large  import penetration ratio, the market discipline effect of
countries, while barriers to foreign entry (imports) would  imports is 13 percent greater in Zimbabwe because of its
have a stronger effect in small countries. After estimating  smaller size.
markups for manufacturing sectors in 41 industrial and
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It is often argued that  an open trade  regime is a powerful instrument  to discipline the
behavior of firms which have market power. The empirical literature investigating the impact
of import competition  on the pricing behavior of domestic firms has concluded that  trade
liberalization forces firms to set prices closer to marginal costs. That  is, there  is a negative
relationship between price-cost margins (markups) and the openness of the economy. Indeed,
Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), and Grether (1996) find some support  for the hypothesis
that imports are a source of market discipline in studies of domestic firms behavior in Turkey,
the Ivory Coast, and Mexico, respectively.
Some may go further and argue that  an open trade regime can be a perfect substitute for
an  active competition policy in small economies (e.g., Blackhurst,  1991). Hong Kong and
Singapore have been used to illustrate this  view as both are very small and open economies
with  no competition policy authority  (WTO,  1997).  Another example of this  view is the
suggestion by a member of Canada's  Bureau of Competition Policy, that  NAFTA reduced
the Bureau's  concern with potentially  harmful conduct (see quote in Cadot,  Grether,  and
de Melo, 2000).
In a simple model of symmetric Cournot equilibrium with a fixed cost of entry that could
be due to government entry regulation, it is shown that  import penetration  has a negative
impact on domestic markup while entry regulations have a positive effect on markups.  It is
also shown that  an increase in market size dampens the former effect while it reinforces the
latter.
These hypotheses are tested  in a sample of 41 developed and  developing countries for
which data  was available. We first estimate  the industry  markups of the countries using a
structural  regression approach developed by Hall (1988) with a random coefficient technique.
The technique allows the markups to vary across industries within each country while at the
same time estimating the  average industry  markup of the countries.  We then  regress the
estimated  average industry  markup  on  measures of entry  regulation,  import  penetration
and their interactions with  country size, controlling for the level of financial development,
2the strength of the institutional  environment protecting property  rights and overall level of
economic development.
We find that  both  entry regulation and import penetration  are statistically  significant
sources of market discipline. Countries that  have lower entry costs or higher import penetra-
tion ratios tend to have lower average industry markups. Moreover, the effects of both entry
regulation and import penetration  on markups depend on the size of the country: the effect
of entry regulation is larger in large countries while the effect of import penetration  is larger
in small countries. Thus, even though Italy and Indonesia impose the same number of entry
regulations to the establishment of new firms, the marginal effect of entry regulation on the
average industry  markup is 20 percent higher in Italy due to its larger size. Similarly, even
though Chile and Zimbabwe have the same import penetration  ratio, the market discipline
effect of imports, due to a marginal increase in import penetration on markups, is 13 percent
higher in Zimbabwe.
We conclude that  complex entry regulations are more likely to harm competition in large
countries, whereas barriers to imports will be more damaging in small economies.
31  Introduction
It  is often argued that  an  open trade  regime is a powerful instrument  to  discipline the
behavior of firms which have market power. The empirical literature investigating the impact
of import  competition on the pricing behavior of domestic firms has concluded that  trade
liberalization forces firms to set prices closer to marginal costs. That  is, there is a negative
relationship between price-cost margins (markups) and the openness of the economy. Indeed,
Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), and Grether (1996) find some support for the hypothesis
that imports are a source of market discipline in studies of domestic firms behavior in Turkey,
the Ivory Coast, and Mexico, respectively.
Some may go further and argue that  an open trade regime can be a perfect substitute for
an active competition policy in small economies (e.g., Blackhurst, 1991).1 Hong Kong and
Singapore have been used to illustrate this view as both  are very small and open economies
with no competition  policy authority  (VWTO,  1997).  Another  example of this view is the
suggestion by a member of Canada's  Bureau of Competition Policy, that  NAFTA reduced
the Bureau's  concern with potentially  harmful conduct (see quote in Cadot,  Grether,  and
de Melo, 2000).2
On the other hand,  in large economies, trade  may play less of a role as a market  disci-
plining device, as internal competition among a large number of firms could be sufficient to
drive markups down. Internal competition will be determined in large part by the prevailing
regulatory regime, including the ease of entry and exit, the efficiency of the financial sector
(access to,  and cost of, credit),  the tightness of budget constraints  (existence of subsidies,
prevalence of state-owned enterprises that  are supported  through the government budget),
and the efficacy  and efficiency  of institutions  to enforce contracts and protect property rights
'For reviews  of the literature, see Levinsohn  (1996),  Roberts and Tybout (1996)  and Evenett, Lehmann,
and Steil (2000).
2Recent evidence  by Konings, Van Cayseele  and Warzynski (2001)  challenges  this view by comparing
markups across  two small open economies:  Belgium  and the Netherlands. They show that firm markups are
higher in the Netherlands,  where there was no strict competition  policy until recently.
4(see Djankov and Hoekman, 2000).
This paper expands on the existing empirical literature  on trade openness and markups
by introducing the role of domestic barriers to entry (and the prevailing domestic regulatory
regime) into the analysis. We focus on studying the relative importance of domestic versus
foreign entry as pro-competitive devices. We ask whether barriers to domestic entry are more
likely to lead to an anti-competitive domestic market than  barriers impeding foreign entry
(i.e., imports), and,  if so, if the size of the domestic economy matters.  The presumption
is that  both  are major aspects of national competition policy regimes.  We also search for
evidence that  in large countries barriers to domestic entry may have larger anti-competitive
effects, while in small countries barriers to foreign entry are more relevant. 3
In a simple model of symmetric Cournot equilibrium with a fixed cost of entry that  could
be due to government entry regulation, it is shown that  import  penetration  has a negative
impact on domestic markup while entry regulations have a positive effect on markups.  It is
also shown that  an increase in market size dampens the former effect while it reinforces the
latter.4
These hypotheses are tested  in a sample of 41 developed and  developing countries for
which data was available.  We first estimate the industry markups  of the countries using a
structural  regression approach developed by Hall (1988) with a random coefficient technique.
The technique allows the markups to vary across industries within each country while at the
same time estimating the  average industry  markup of the countries.  We then regress the
3We put the emphasis  on entry regulation  rather than on the whole  competition policy  package  for two
reasons. First, entry regulation  has often  been described  as one of the most important components  of national
competition  policy (see Rodriguez,  A. E. and Malcolm  Coate, 1997). Second, a recent study by Djankov
et al (2000)  has made available  a data set containing detailed information  on entry regulation for a large
number of countries. As highlighted  in Levinsohn (1996), Hoekman  and Holmes (1999) and Maskus and
Lahouel  (2000),  competition  policy  refers  to the multi-faceted  national laws,  rules and regulations  that affect
the market structure and the conduct of firms in the domestic  economy.  This is therefore  a much broader
concept  than  competition  law or  antitrust.  In many  of the  countries in our  sample  there  is no effective
competition policy or law.
4We abstract  from the relevance of the  existence of more or less competitive  international  markets.  For a
discussion of this and the interaction  of trade  and compeption  (merger) policy, see Francois and  Horn (2000)
or Horn and Levinsohn (2001).
5estimated  average industry  markup  on measures of entry regulation,  import  penetration
and their interactions  with country size, controlling for the level of financial development,
the strength of the institutional  environment protecting property rights and overall level of
economic development.
We find that  both  entry regulation and  import penetration  are statistically significant
sources of market discipline. Countries that  have lower entry costs or higher import penetra-
tion ratios tend to have lower average industry markups.  Moreover, the effects of both entry
regulation and import penetration  on markups depend on the size of the country: the effect
of entry regulation is larger in large countries while the effect of import penetration is larger
in small countries. Thus, even though Italy and Indonesia impose the same number of entry
regulations to the establishment of new firrns, the marginal effect of entry regulation on the
average industry  markup is 20 percent higher in Italy  due to its larger size. Similarly, even
though  Chile and Zimbabwe have the same import penetration  ratio, the market  discipline
effect of imports, due to a marginal increase in import penetration  on markups, is 13 percent
higher in Zimbabwe.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and section 3 discusses
the  empirical strategy.  Section 4 contains the  main empirical results  and  quantifies the
effects of barriers to domestic and foreign entry on markups.  Section 5 discusses a series of
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. Data sources can be found in the Appendix.
2  A  Simple  Model
To illustrate the effect of entry regulation and import penetration  on domestic markups, let
us assume that  domestic and  foreign firms are Cournot  players in the domestic market of
a homogenous good. There are N identicaL  domestic firms and  one importing  foreign firm.
The marginal cost of production for the domestic and foreign firms are c and d, respectively.
Domestic firms face a positive fixed cost of entry, E,  associated with government imposed
6entry regulation. Taking the quantity  produced by other firms, q-,,  as given, each domestic
firm n chooses its output by maximizing its profits:
mqal  7n (qn,  q-.)  = p (Q) q. - cq,-  E,  kln  = 1,.,  N,
where p(Q) is the inverse demand function, Q =  qD  + qm =  ,  qi + qm, qD  is the total
domestic production,  and qM is the  import  quantity.  The first order  condition  for profit
maximization implies:
p (Q)  ri  _q,]  =  c,
where E  - (9Q/Op) (p/Q)  is the price elasticity of demand.
In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, given identical domestic firms, total  domestic pro-
duction is given by qD =  N  qn. Let m* =  /qD be the import penetration  ratio.  Substi-
tuting the equilibrium condition and m* into each firm's first order condition, we obtain:
''  1_N  1  (1M-  1
Thus,  the markup in the domestic industry  is inversely related to the  equilibrium import
penetration  ratio, m* and the number of firms. 5
To see how the fixed cost of entry, E affects the equilibrium markup, we need to solve for
the equilibrium number of domestic firms. For simplicity, let us assume a unitary  constant
demand elasticity function:
p(Q) =  = a  qi+qM]  (2)
5See Jacquemin  (1982) for a similar derivation.
7where a  captures  the  size of the  market  (i.e., in equilibrium a  =  p*Q*).  The  Cournot
equilibrium is described by:
aNd  *  aN(cN-dN+d)  *  d+cN  ad2
(d + cN)2'  (d + cN)2 I  =  N  X  'n  =  (d + cN) 2 -E.  (3)
Domestic firms will enter  the market as long as irn >  0.  Thus, solving 7rn  =  0 for the
optimal number of firms yields:
N*  =  d  (r;  _1)  (4)
Combining Equations  (1) and (4) leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition  1  In  a symmetric  Cournot equilibrium with some fixed number of  domestic
firms and one foreign firm facing a unitary constant demand elasticity in the domestic mar-
ket:
1. the higher the equilibrium import penetration ratio the lower the markup;
2. the higher the cost of entry, the higher the markup;
3. an increase in the equilibrium import penetration ratio has a weaker effect on markup
in large countries;
4.  an increase in the cost of entry has a stronger effect on markup in large countries;
Proof.  FRom  equations (1) and  (4):
1.  - (N'(1+m*)-1)
2 < 0 given N*.
2.  a9  aa  =  (O-  '-+M  2  (-- 1dV' 3 E)  > 0 given  m*. OE  - N*  8E  (N*(+m  2  ,  2c
3.  02A'  0  2/-'  ON*  N'(l+m')+l  i\{d  / 
OmOa  - 8m*N  Oa  (N.(1+m-)-1))  ( 2 c  aEJ
84-  -a  (-(N(1+m*)-1) 2 )  ( 4 c  )  >0givenm.
Thus, we expect import  penetration  to have a negative effect on markup, while entry
regulation should have a positive impact on markups. In addition, we expect the former effect
to be stronger  in small countries, whereas the latter  should be stronger  in large countries.
The intuition behind the existence of higher markups  in countries with high entry cost or
low import penetration  ratios is straightforward.  To see why these effects are respectively
amplified and  reduced in large countries note that  for a given fixed cost of entry, a larger
market  size allows more domestic firms in the market,  which drives down the markup due
to increased competition among domestic firms. In such a situation,  the (negative) effect of
import penetration  on markup will be smaller given that  the initial markup is low. Taking
this to its limit, one would not expect any impact of an increase in import penetration  on
domestic markups if the market is already perfectly competitive.  On the other hand,  for a
given level of import  penetration,  countries with high entry costs will have fewer domestic
firms in equilibrium. In a large market, this implies high markups.
3  Empirical  Strategy
To test the four hypotheses in Proposition 1 we use data on the number of entry procedures
required to  establish  a new firm and  import  penetration  for the  manufacturing  sector in
different countries. 6 This will allow  us to test whether countries with more restrictive barriers
to domestic and foreign entry have less competitive domestic markets  (as measured by the
6The data  on the  number of entry procedures is available in Djankov  et al.  (2000).  As a  proxy for the
cost of entry regulation they also estimate  the number of weeks that  it takes to register a firm and the dollar
cost  as  a share  of GDP  per  capita.  Results  reported  in  the  next  sections  are  robust  to  the  use  of these
different proxies, but we believe that  the number of entry procedures is probably  the most exogenous of all
these proxies.
9average industry markups).  More specifically, we run the following  cross-country regression:
Ac  =  f3o +  AeEc  +  3mmc  +  JesEC * size,  + /msmc  * SiZe  +  E  3,Cvc  +  (c7  (5)
v
where industry  markups  are regressed on entry regulation, E,  import  penetration  m  and
their interaction with country size, size.
7
We use three additional control variables, C,,  to capture  the overall business climate in
each country. First, we control for the level of financial development as proxied by the ratio
of market capitalization to GDP. 8 The idea is that  the wider and deeper the financial sector,
the lower the cost of capital is likely to be  (all other things constant),  thus increasing the
overall "profitability" of the  economy. Financial deepening will be  associated with credit
that  is tailored to better  reflect underlying risks, financial products  will be tailored to the
needs of borrowers, transactions  costs will be reduced, etc.  All other things equal, this  is
likely to raise industry  markups.  Without; controlling for overall "profitability"  of a coun-
try,  the market discipline effect of imports  on domestic industry  may be  underestimated.
The second control variable is an  intellecl;ual property protection  law index developed by
Ginarte and Park  (1995). This scores the institutional  environment prevailing in countries
according to (1) the coverage of legislation protecting intellectual property, (2) membership
in relevant international  agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection,  (4) enforcement
mechanisms and (5) duration  of protection.  The index ranges from 0 to 5; the higher the
index, the stronger the intellectual property regime. Even though the share of manufacturing
that is affected by intellectual property laws that  grant temporary monopoly power may be
quite small, the strength of such legal regimes is a good proxy for the effectiveness  of a whole
range of institutions that determine the strength of property rights and affect the investment
7The variable size  is proxied by GDP, but results reported in the next  sections  are robust  to the use of
population  as an alternative.
8Market capitalization  over GDP  plays a role that  is similar to the  capital output  ratio  in industry-level
price-cost margin regressions. See Roberts  and Ty,bout  (1996).
10climate.  The stronger the legal and institutional  regime, the lower uncertainty  and  associ-
ated transaction  costs, and  (all other things equal), the  higher should be the profitability
of domestic firms.  Finally, as an additional  control for overall economic and institutional
development we introduce GDP per capita.9
The  first step  before estimating  the markup equation  is to  obtain  a  good measure of
industry  price over marginal cost markups across countries.  As such data  are not readily
available, they either need to be constructed using the ratio of total  sales over total costs of
the industries (as in Roberts and Tybout 1996), or estimated from a well-defined  structural
regression a la Hall (1988), Levinsohn (1992) and Harrison (1993).  The advantage of the
latter approach is that it has a sound theoretical basis;` 0 the drawback is that  it comes with
estimation error.  It also increases the level of aggregation at which markups are measured
as degrees of freedom requirements associated with the estimation  imply that  some of the
time or cross-industry dimension in the data would have to be sacrificed.
To determine whether this is a significant problem, two accounting margins for 28 indus-
tries in 74 countries over 18 years (1980-1997)  were constructed using UNIDO data.'
ml= Costsof  Total Sales
Costs of Labor, Capital and Materials'
Total Value Added
2  Costs of Labor and Capital
Tables 1 and  2 present the results of a multiple factors analysis of variance (ANOVA)
for both  accounting margins, Ml and M2. The high F-statistics  suggest that  there  are sig-
nificant differences in these margins across countries and  industries.  On the  other hand,
9Djankov  et al.  (2000) find that  the  negative relation  between markups  and  entry regulation  vanishes
once they control for GDP per capita.
I0It  can be shown that  the constructed  markups  are equal to the estimated  markups  only in the presence
of constant returns  to scale.  See Basu and  Fernald (1995).
"See  the  appendix for details  on the  construction  of capital  cost.  As suggested  above  M2 is closer to
the  industry  markup,  u, as presented  in Equation  (11),  and they  will be identical  in the  case of a constant
returns to scale production  technology: Hi = Si * M21 Vi. Fbr a proof, see Kee (2000). A major drawback of
these margins is that  there  are sensitive to the different accounting practice in different countries.
11the hypothesis that  there  is no difference in the margins across years, after controlling for
country and  industry  variations,  cannot be  rejected.  Moreover, if only country, industry
and year dummies are used to capture  the variation of the two accounting margins, nearly
60 percent  of the explanatory power of the model can be attributed  to  country variations.
Industry variations account for less than 40 percent, while year dummies contribute less than
5 percent. 12
Thus, the data suggest that  after controlling for industry differences, there are significant
differences in margins across countries. This supports the use of a cross country analysis to
study the effects of import competition and entry regulations on average industry  markups.
On the other hand,  high within-country differences in industry  markups call for a random
coefficient estimation that  explicitly takes into account industry variation while estimating
the average industry  markup of each country.
Given the  theoretical merits of estimating  the markups  and the fact that  most of the
variance in  accounting margins is explained by country variation,  we choose to  estimate
the average industry  markups.  The constructed accounting margins are used as robustness
checks in the empirical sections below.
As mentioned earlier, the use of the  estimated markup as a dependent  variable brings
some econometric complications.  Since the  precision with  which the  markups  have been
estimated  varies across countries,  the  error  term  in  Equation  (5) is heteroscedastic.  In
principle one could use Feasible GLS (FGLS) to  correct for this.  However, given that  the
properties  of FGLS  are not  clear in  small samples (see Amemiya,  1978, 1985), we first
use non-parametric heteroscedasticity correction and then present parametric corrections as
robustness checks.' 3
Finally, we provide a series of specification tests.  These include the Ramsey omitted vaxi-
12The explanatory  power of variable  X is inferred by taking the ratio of the partial sum of squares of X
to the model  sum of squares.
13For a  discussion  of the advantage of parametric correction in the presence of estimated dependent
variables  in small and large samples, see Kee and Olarreaga (2001).
12able test, the goodness-of-link-test, two outlier sensitivity analyses and instrument  variable
regression for the potential  endogeneity of the import penetration  variable.
3.1  Estimating  Markups
In order to estimate manufacturing markups, for each country, let the output  of industry i
in period t be characterized by a production function of labor input,  Lit, and capital input,
Kit,
qit = AitFi (Lit, Kit)  (6)
Differentiating Equation  (6) with respect to time and dividing both  sides by qit yields the
growth rate version of Equation  (6):14
qit =  A1t + aiLLit  + aiKKit, where  (7)
aiL -Lit  OFi  Knd  aiK  =it  OFi  (8)
OtL=Fi OLi X an  i  Fit WKit(8
are the elasticity of output with respect to labor and capital inputs,  respectively.' 5
For each industry  i,  assume that  the production  function Fi is homogeneous of degree
Si.  Fi shows increasing, constant,  or decreasing returns  to scale with respect to all inputs
when Si  is greater  than,  equal to,  or less than  unity.  Subtracting  the growth rate  of the
1Here we  adopt the convention  to denote the growth rate of a variable with
OinXt  1  OXt
a  yt  &
15As suggested  by Basu and Fernald (1995),  one  may be concerned  that the growth rate of real value  added
is used here instead of the growth rate of real output, given that due to the construction of value-added
statistics, the growth rate of real value added will not be independent  of the growth rate of intermediate
inputs if the market is not perfectly competitive (even when production functions are weakly  separable).
However,  Kee (2000)  suggests  that empirically  this may not be such a serious  problem. Moroever,  UNIDO's
industry level data set only provides real output measurement  for a few countries. The empirical  results
remain qualitatively  similar  when output of industry is used rather than value added.
13capital input from both side of Equation  (',) and applying Euler's theorem for homogeneous
functions, we can re-express Equation  (7) as:16
qit = Ait + aiLiit  + (Si  - 1)  kit,  (10)





be the price over marginal cost markup of industry  i, and  let 
0iL  be the share of labor in
total  revenue.'7 Given that  aiL =  AiOiL,  Equation  (10) becomes
4it  =  ±-t  + Hi (OiLJit)  + (Si - 1) Kit-  (12)
Equation  (12) can be used to estimate  markups.  Note that  it is crucial to control for
the growth rate of technological progress, Ait, as it enters the firm's first-order conditions
for profit maximization, which in turn  determine both  input demand and output.  Without
controlling for Ait, the  least  squares estimates  for the  coefficients of the  growth rate  of
labor per unit of capital  and  the growth rate  of capital  will be biased.  As the  growth of
technological progress in each industry  is difficult to measure, we assume the Hicks neutral
" 6According to Euler's  theorem,  if a production  Fi (Lit, Kit)  is homogeneous of degree Si with respect to
its inputs,  then
aiL  +  aiK  =  Si  (9)
" 7Note that  in order to be able to econometrically identify Hi, it is assumed that  pi is constant  through
time.  This can be defended given the  results of the  ANOVA tables  discussed above.
14technological progress parameter  is a random variable of the following  form:
Ait  =  A-oit,
A-t  = (it = Ai + uit,  (13)
where A1o is the technological level of industry  i  in period 0, and  Oit is the  growth rate
of technological progress.  This  implies that  the growth rate  of technological progress in
industry i in period t consists of an industry-specific growth rate, Ai, and a white noise, uit,
which is a classical random error term with zero mean and a.2  variance.
Substituting  Equation  (13) into Equation  (12) we obtain
4it  =Ai,  +  pLi (OiJlitA  +  (Si  -1)  kit  +  Uft-  (14)
To estimate  Equation  (14), we use a  stationary  random  coefficient model.  The industry
specific productivity  growth rate, markup and scale coefficients are assumed to  be random
variables with some probability distribution  around the industry  averages:
A 1 A Ai  =  A +  l
H,i  =  A +  e2i
Si  =  S  +  e3i,
E (Ek)  =  0, Vk = 1, 2,3
E (ekSlA  =  2,(  ak,  Vk = I
E  0,Vkl  (15
This  significantly reduces the number of parameters  to  be  estimated,  while allowing the
coefficients  to differ across industries.  Equation (14) can be therefore be simplified to become
15a fixed coefficient regression with a heteroscedastic error term,  Wit:
qit  =  A±p  iJLit'  + (S-  1)  kit  + wit
Wit=  Eli  +  E2i (9iLiit'  + E3iKit +  Utt.  (16)
In other words, instead of assuming that  all industries have the same markup, productivity
growth and scale coefficient and estimating Equation  (14) using ordinary least squares, we
estimate the (weighted) average industry markup, productivity growth and scale coefficient  in
each country using a random coefficient panel regression. The random coefficient regression
significantly cuts down on the data  requirements, as it permits using the time series cross-
industry  panel data  set  of each country to  estimate the  country-specific average industry
markup, while taking into account that  there is within country variation across industries.
The main problem associated with  estimating such a random coefficient model is that
the error term wit is heteroscedastic.  Most of the solutions that  have been proposed in the
literature  for such a problem revolve around some type of Aitken estimates.  This involves
FGLS as the covariance matrix  of wit needs to be estimated." 8 Here we follow the approach
suggested by Swamy (1970) and use the least squares residuals to obtain unbiased estima-
tors of the covariance matrix  of wit. Zeller (1969) shows that  as long as the industry-specific
coefficients  are not correlated with the explanatory variables, which is the assumption made
in Swamy (1970), the model will not posses an aggregation bias. This implies that  Swamy's
estimation of average industry  markup can be interpreted  as an aggregate markup of each
country's manufacturing sector. A test of common coefficients  is rejected for the vast major-
ity of the countries in our sample, supporting the random coefficient model.  The appendix
discusses the data  and the construction of the variables used in the first and second stages
of the estimation (in particular  capital stocks at the industry  level).
'8See  Hildreth and Houck  (1968),  Swamy  (1970,  1971,  1974),  Amemiya  (1978)  and Hsiao  (1975,  1986)  and
Greene (2000)  provide  a textbook treatment.
164  Empirical  Results
Table 3 presents our cross country data  set,  together with the estimated  average industry
markup and  its standard  error.  Fifteen of the forty one countries in the sample have an
estimated markup that  is greater than one and statistically significant (denoted by a '*X).19
Countries with the highest estimated markups in the sample are Mexico, Peru and Colombia.
All three have a very low ratio of imports to value added in manufacturing.  In the case of
Peru, the ratio is 75 percent below the sample mean, whereas Mexico and Colombia are 50
percent below the mean. On the other hand, the total number of entry procedures necessary
to establish a new firm in any of these countries is on the high side. With  17 required entry
procedures, Colombia is the most restrictive country in the sample.  Mexico and Peru with
15 and 14 entry procedures, respectively, are 50 percent  above the sample mean.
Among the more developed countries, Japan,  the United States and the United Kingdom
have the highest industry markups.  Even though in terms of entry regulations, both  the US
and UK are less restrictive, the imports to value added ratio of all these countries is below
average.  Indeed, with  an import to value added ratio of 0.11, Japanese industries face the
least import competition among all the countries in the sample.  On the other hand,  Hong
Kong and Singapore are by far the most open economies in the sample and have estimated
average industry  markups below the sample mean.  These observations suggest that  both
limited  import  competition  and  restrictive entry  regulation are determinants  of industry
markup across countries.
This is confirmed by the results of the second stage cross-country regression reported in
Table 4.  The first column provides the  OLS regression results  with no heteroscedasticity
correction.  Both  entry regulation and  import  penetration  have the  expected signs.  The
l9The only country that has an estimated markup that is significantly  less than one is Denmark, which
could be due to data problems.  Estimation results axe robust to the exclusion  of Demnark from the regres-
sions. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected in only seven countries: Denmark, Finland,
Malaysia,  Pakistan, Singapore  and the United Kingdom.  In all other countries  we found  evidence  of constant
returns to scale, which  is consistent  with previous  findings  in the literature at this level  of aggregation.
17coefficient of entry regulation  is positive and  significant, while the  coefficient on import
penetration  is negative, but  is only significant at a 90 percent confidence level.
Column (2) presents the first non-parametric  heteroscedasticity correction, where the fi-
nite sample White standard  errors are reported in parentheses. 20 Both entry regulation and
import penetration  are now highly significant. Ceteris pan bus, higher industry  markups are
associated with higher fixed cost of entry and lower import penetration.  Both the market
capitalization ratio  and intellectual property protection index have a positive effect on in-
dustry markups while GDP per capita is negatively related to markups.  However,  given that
institutional development and economic development are highly correlated, it is not surpris-
ing that  only the coefficient of market capitalization ratio is significant, the coefficients on
intellectual property protection index and GDP per capita are not precisely estimated.
To avoid multicollinearity, we introduce the two interacting terms between market  size
with  entry  cost and  market  size with  import  penetration  separately  in  columns (3) and
(4).  The coefficients  of the two interacting  terms are highly significant and  have the right
signs, suggesting that  country size does matter.  As predicted in Proposition  1, country size
reinforces the effect of entry regulation on markups, while dampening  the effect of import
penetration  on markups.21
4.1  How  Large  Are  These  Effects?
The  econometric results  suggest that  trade  openness and  regulation  of entry  are impor-
tant  determinants  of industry  markups  across countries and  that  economiic  size dampens
20The large sample  White standard error correction  uses the observed  squared residual u2 as an estimate
of a2, the variance  of the regression  error of the jth  observation. The finite sample White standard error
(HC1) multiply u2 by n/ (n - k) to adjust for degrees  of freedom  of the regression. In the next subsection
we  provide  similar  results using alternative heteroscedasticity  corrections.
2 "Note that when these are entered together, all coefficients  keep the right sign, but the two interacting
terms become  significant  only at the 10 and 15 percent level  due to multicollinearity.  On the other hand, we
also explore  the possibility  that countries  have different  responds to import and domestic  competition  due
to the different  level  of development.  We interact the two variables  with GDP per capita of the countries.
The estimated coefficients  are however  not significant.
18(strengthens) the impact of the former (latter).  But how large are these effects?
Using the estimates  reported  in the second column of Table 4 and the sample median
provided in Table 3, the estimated elasticity of markup with respect to entry regulation and
import penetration,  evaluated at the sample median, are 0.58 and -0.14 respectively. 22 This
implies that  a 10 percent  increase in entry regulations leads to an increase of 5.8 percent in
the markup (or 11 percentage points from the median). Similarly, a 10 percent reduction in
import penetration,  which at the median is equivalent to a fall from 86 percent to 77 percent
in the ratio of imports to value-added in manufacturing, leads to  an increase of 1.4 percent
in the markup (or 3 percentage points from the median).
One can further  illustrate  the  magnitude of these impacts  with  some thought  experi-
ments. Let us consider moving from the most to the least restrictive scenario in our sample.
As mentioned before, with the number of entry procedures at  17, Colombia has the most
restrictive entry  regulation in our sample.  The estimated  markup of Colombia is 3.94, a
level that  is way above the sample mean and median.  If the  Colombian's government de-
creases the number of entry procedures to the sample minimum of 2 procedures in Canada,
its industry markup would drop by 43 percent to 2.24, a level close to that  of Indonesia.
On the other hand,  with  the import penetration  ratio  of 0.11, Japan  is the least open
countries in our sample.  Its  estimated markup is 3.2, which is a level that  is above both
mean and median of our sample.  If the Japanese' import  penetration  ratio increase to the
sample maximum of 7.39 as in Hong Kong, 23 the Japanese' industry  markup would drop by
22The estimated  elasticity  of variable Y with respect  to variable  X,  evaluated  at  the  sample median, is
calculated as
.9YX
where o  is the estimated  coefficient when Y is regressed on X  (among other variables),  and X  and  Y are
the median values of X and  Y in the sample. We choose to evaluate the elasticity around  the median rather
the the  mean values is due  to the  extreme  value consideration.  Given that  our  sample  consists of a wide
range of developed and developing countries, the mean value of some variables, e.g.  GDP, is easily influenced
by the most developed countries.
23This is clearly a thought experiment way beyond any possible policy change by the Japanese government.
19nearly 70 percent to almost 1, a level close to that  of the Netherlands.
Country size matters  for the relative importance of these elasticities, as the interacting
terms in the two last columns of Table 4 are statistically significant.  Using the estimated
coefficient of the interacting term reportedl in the third column of Table 4, one can calculate
the impact that  entry regulation has in srnall and large countries. For concreteness, we can
once again do some thought experiments. While both Italy and Indonesia require 11 different
procedures to  set up a new firm, Italy  is nearly 7 times larger than  Indonesia in terms of
GDP. Straightforward calculations show that  a marginal increase in entry regulation will
have a nearly 20 percent larger effect in Italy due to its larger size.
Similarly, we can compare the market discipline  impact of imports in Chile and Zimbabwe.
VVhile  both countries have the same import penetration ratio in manufacturing of 90 percent,
Chilean's GDP is nearly 7 times larger. The estimates of the fourth column in Table 4 suggest
that  a marginal increase in import penetration  in Zimbabwe has a nearly 13 percent larger
effect on markups due to its smaller size.
In summary, the above thought experiments illustrate that complex entry regulations are
more likely to harm competition in large countries, whereas barriers to imports will be more
d(amaging  in small economies.
5  Robustness  Checks
In this  section we provide three  different-  robustness checks to the results  reported  above.
First, we provide results using alternative non-parametric and parametric  heteroscedasticity
corrections.  Second, we provide a series of specification tests  and control for the potential
endogeneity of the import penetration ratio.  Finally, we provide alternative results using the
constructed markups  (rather than the estimated  ones) at the industry  level as a dependent
variable.
205.1  Heteroscedasticity
Could the results reported in Table 4 be driven by heteroscedasticity  correction  that is em-
ployed? Table 5 presents three other kinds of heteroscedasticity  correction. In the first
column, the Davidson-Mackinnon  (1993)  version  of jackknife  standard error is reported for
our base-line  OLS regression." Bias-corrected  bootstrap standard errors are shown  in the
second  column. 2"  Given  that jackknife  standard errors (HC3)  are more  conservative  than the
finite sample  White standard errors (HC1),  it is not surprising  to find that the significance
levels  of the OLS estimated coefficients  are reduced in column (1) of Table 5. Nevertheless,
the coefficients  of interest are still significant  at the 90 percent confidence  level. 26 On the
other hand, the bias-corrected  confidence  intervals  using the bootstrap standard errors pre-
sented in column (2) once again show  the estimated coefficients  of the variables  of interest
are significant  at the 95 percent level. Thus, all the non-parametric corrections  of het-
eroscedasticity  produce comparable  results: both entry regulation and import penetration
are important in affecting  domestic  competition.
Column (3) of Table 5 applies a parametric correction  using feasible  GLS. Given that
the variance  of the error term in Equation (5) has a country specific  component  associated
with the standard error of the estimated markup,  we first regress  the error term of Equation
(5) on a constant and the variance  of the estimated markup. 27 We then use the inverse  of
the fitted value of the error term as weights  on the second  stage estimation of Equation (5).
All the estimated  coefficients  are not significantly  different  from the OLS  estimates,  and the
FGLS standard errors are of comparable  magnitudes, generating both quantitatively and
24Letting hjj be the diagonal element  of the projection (hat) matrix, Davidson and MacKinnon  (1993)
show that Uj/ (1 - hj) 2 approximates the jackknife  standard error, which has been shown in MacKinnon
and White (1985),  to out-perform HC1  in their Monte Carlo finite sample experiments.
25Efron  (1977)  shows  that bootstrap is a more  general  method  that has a linear approximation  as jackknife.
261n fact, it is comforting  to know that with the most conservative  standard errors, the p-values  of the
estimated coefficients  of entry regulation, import penetration and market capitalization  are 0.051,  0.067  and
0.06 respectively,  which  are relatively  low.
27This is to capture both the homoscedastic  and heteroscedastic  parts of the regression  errors.  For a
detailed exposition  of the procedure, please  refer to Kee and Olarreaga (2001).
21qualitatively similar results to our base-line regression in Table 4.  A Hausman test cannot
reject the hypothesis that  FGLS is efficient. 28
In sum, the results of both parametric  and non-parametric heteroscedasticity corrections
suggest that  the results regarding the importance of entry regulation and import competition
on industry  markups are robust.  Controlling for economic and  institutional  development,
countries that  have fewer entry regulations or greater  import  penetration  tend  to  have a
lower average industry  markup.
5.2  Specification  Tests
Could the results of Table 4 be driven by some relevant variables that  are omitted in the
regression that  are related  to  the regressors?  Two types  of general specification test  are
performed to the base-line regression in Table 4. The first is the Ramsey (1969) RESET test
on omitted variables, and the second is the goodness-of-link test proposed by Tukey (1949)
and Pregibon  (1980) on model specification.
Under the null hypothesis that  there  is no relevant omitted variable in the regression,
Ramsey (1969) shows that  the error  terms of the regression should be independent  on a
polynomial of the predicted dependent variable. Row (1) of Table 6 shows the result of the
RESET test.  With a low F-statistic,  the null hypothesis that  there is no omitted variable in
the base-line regression is not rejected in for any conventional confidence level.
Row (2) of Table 6 presents the result of the link test. Under the null hypothesis that there
is no mis-specification, Pregibon (1980) shows that the dependent variable is independent on
the square of the predicted dependent variable. The low F-statistics  again suggest that  the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus, we conclude that  the data  do not reveal evidence
of mis-specification of our base-line regression.
28Under the null hypothesis that  FGLS is nct systematically  different  from OLS with White standard
errors, the X2) is 0.95 and the null hypothesis  is not rejected at the 99 percent confidence  level.
22Could the results be  driven by some outlier observations?  Given the small number of
observations in the second stage, we perform the following  outlier analysis. We exclude one
observation at a time and re-run the regression using the rest of the 40 countries.  Results
of these 41 additional  regressions show that  the coefficient of entry regulation varies from
0.09 to 0.13. Similarly, the coefficient of import penetration  varies between -0.27 and -0.39.
Given that these coefficients  do not change sign and they are not significantly different from
the base-line estimates, we conclude that  results in Table 4 are not driven by any particular
observation.
In addition,  we also perform an  "influential observation" test suggested by Bollen and
Jackman (1990), which simply identifies any observation that  shifts the estimates by at least
one standard error.  None of the observations in our sample are influential for the estimated
coefficients  on entry regulation and import penetration  reported in Table 4.
Finally,  import  penetration  may  be  endogenous to  markups,  as sectors  with  higher
markups may attract  foreign exporters.  To control for this we instrument  the import pen-
etration  ratio  using the  trade  shares constructed  by Frankel and  Romer (1999) using the
geography determinants of a gravity type model, total population and the surface are of the
countries (column (4) of Table 5).29 Not only is the estimated coefficient on import penetra-
tion significantly different from zero, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger than the OLS
estimate. With a X() of 0.95, the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that  our
OLS estimates are consistent and efficient. This suggests that  OLS does not over-estimate
the effect of import  penetration  on average industry  markup.  Countries that  are exposed
to larger import penetration  tend to have lower industry  markups.  This result echoes the
finding in Frankel and Romer (1999), where OLS is shown to  under-estimate  the effect of
trade  openness to economic growth.
Summing up, a series of specification tests  do not  reveal specification problems in the
29Under  the assumption  of balance  trade, import share is half of the constructed trade share.
23data that  lead to estimation bias in our base-line regression.
5.3  The  Accounting  Margins
Our last robustness check is on the validity of the estimated average industry  markups. We
first check for the correlation between estimated and constructed markups  (M2) controlling
for country, industry  and  time  effects.  Second, we provide results  of the  estimation  of
Equation  (5),  using the  constructed  rather  than  the estimated  markup  as the dependent
variable.
The first column of Table 7 presents the results of the correlation between M2 and the
estimated average industry markup.  The estimated industry markup is positively correlated
with the accounting margin M2. Note that  theoretically they would be equal if both  were
provided at the same level of aggregation and in the presence of constant  returns  to scale.
The second column of Table 7, provides the results of the estimation of Equation  (5) using
the constructed  markup.  All the coefficients have the right sign and  are highly significant.
Similar results are obtained  when using M1 as the constructed  markup.
Thus,  even though  the  accounting margins are not  good  measurements of price-cost
markups of industries, the above exercises suggest that  the estimated industry markups and
the regression results are robust.
6  Concluding  Remarks
It is sometimes suggested that small open economies have little need for domestic competition
policy to restrain anti-competitive behavior by domestic firms in small open economies. The
idea is that an open trade regime may be a sufficiently  powerful instrument  to discipline firm
behavior. We explored this idea in a simple Cournot model, where domestic firms face foreign
competition and confront a fixed cost of entry or establishment  (proxied by the number of
24entry procedures necessary to the register a new firm). The model suggests that  the impact
on domestic markups of entry regulation increases with country size, and that  an increase
in trade  openness, as measured by the import penetration  ratio,  will have a larger impact
on domestic markups  in small economies. The intuition is that  large economies support  a
larger number of domestic firms, making domestic entry regulation (or competition policy)
more relevant for the determination of domestic markups, as most of the competition in the
domestic market comes from domestic firms.
Using a sample of 41 developing and  developed countries, we find evidence that  both
domestic entry regulation and international trade  openness are important  determinants  of
the degree of competition in domestic markets,  as measured by average industry  markups.
A 10 percent increase in the number of procedures necessary to set up a new firm from the
sample median would lead to  an increase of 5.8 percent  from the median  markup.  A 10
percent  decrease in trade  openness from the sample median of 90 percent  would increase
markups by 1.4 percent.
Country  size matters  for the impact  of both  entry  regulation and  import  penetration
on markups.  Economic size strengthens  the  impact on markups  of entry  regulation and
dampens the impact of import penetration.  For example, even though Italy and Indonesia
impose the same number of entry regulations to the establishment of new firms, their impact
on average industry  markup is 20 percent  higher in Italy  due to  its larger size.  Similarly,
Chile and  Zimbabwe have the  same import  penetration  ratio,  but  the  market  discipline
effect of imports  on markups  is 13 percent  higher in  Zimbabwe due  to  its  smaller size.
We conclude that  complex entry regulations  are more likely to harm competition  in large
countries, whereas barriers to imports will be more damaging in small economies.
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30A  Data
Data used in the first stage regression consist of twenty eight industries (ISIC 3 digit) in forty
one countries for the period of 1981 to 1997 (annual).  Country coverage can be found in Table
3.  UNIDO (1999) provides industry  level data  on value added, number of workers, capital
expenditure  for the countries.  GDP deflators on the value added of manufacturing  sector
and domestic capital formation are used as prices for industry  value added and investment,
which are found in the World Development Indicators  (2000). In the second stage, we use
the total  number of legal procedures necessary to register a new firm to proxy for the fixed
cost of entry, as provided in Djankov et al.  (2000). Import penetration  is measured as the
ratio  of import to total  industry  value added.  It  is constructed  using data  from the World
Development Indicators  (2000). Among our control variables we use the patent  protection
index from Ginarte and Park (1995), a market capitalization measure available in the World
Development Indicators  (2000). The sample coverage was mainly constrained  by the  lack
of industry  level data  in the UNIDO database and the associated matching coverage of the
regulation of entry data set in Djankov et al. (2000).
Building  Capital  Stocks
Data on industry level capital stocks used in the first stage of the estimation procedure were
constructed  using the perpetual inventory method:
Kit = Kit-,  (l  - 6) + Iit,
where I,t  is the real investment of industry  i in period t,  and 6 is the rate  of depreciation
of capital stock, which is assumed to be 10 percent.  For each industry  in each country, the
value of real investment is generated  by deflating capital expenditure  of each industry  by
the GDP deflator of gross domestic capital formation of the country.  In order to minimize
31the impact of under-estimation  of the initial capital  stock on the growth of capital input,
we use the earliest available data  on capital expenditure in UNIDO as the base year capital
stock. 30 For the period 1990-1995,  the cross-country unweighted average annual growth rate
of capital stock ranged from a 3 percent in the leather product  industry to  a 12 percent in
the petroleum industry  and glass products industry.  On the other hand,  the cross-industry
unweighted average annual growth rate of capital stock ranged from more than a 20 percent
increase in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to more than  a 2 percent decrease in Egypt
and Norway.
30For some countries, we move as far back as 1963 to construct  capital input series, which is the first year
of the UNIDO data set.  Interpolation  is performned  for some investment series that  have missing values.
32Table  1: Analysis  of Variance:  Ml
Partial Sum  Degree of  Sum of
Source  I of Squares  Freedom  Squares  F-Statistics Prob > F
Model  1050.57  117  8.98  10.11  0.00
Country  626.69  73  8.58  9.67  0.00
Industry  400.64  27  14.84  16.71  0.00
Year  17.34  17  1.02  1.15  0.30
Residual  14872.13  16744  0.89
Total  15922.70  16861  0.94
Table  2: Analysis  of Variance:  M2
|Partial Sum  Degree of  Sum of
Source  [  of Squares  Freedom  Squares  F-Statistics Prob > F
Model  32485.45  117  277.65  3.82  0.00
Country  18531.66  73  253.86  3.49  0.00
Industry  12108.51  27  448.46  6.17  0.00
Year  1599.30  17  94.08  1.29  0.18
Residual  1233470.73  16968  72.69
Total  1265956.18  17085  74.10
33Table 3: Main Data
Ratio of
Imports to  GDP per
Value Added  Ratio of Total  Capital  GDP  Frankel &  Surface
Estimated  Standard  in  Total  Market Intellectual  (thousand  (trillion  Romer  Area  Total
Country  Industry  Error of Manufacturing  Number of  Capitalization  Protection  of 1995  of  1995  Trade  (million  Population
Code  Country Name  Markup  Markup  Sector






AUS  Australia  1.84  0.82  0.76  3  89.84  3.86  18.34  0.312  0.02  7.74  16.85
AUT  Austria  1.30  0.23  1.01  12  13.1  4.24  26.36  0.206  0.18  0.08  7.78
BGR  Bulgaria  2.38  3.78  1.35  11  2.9  2.57  1.53  0.013  0.16  0.11  8.68
CAN  Canada  2.46*  0.33  0.99  2  67.78  3.24  18.54  0.513  0.02  9.97  27.56
CHL  Chile  2.99*  0.8  0.93  12  81.03  2.74  3.22  0.043  0.04  0.76  13.03
COL  Colombia  3.94*  1.2  0.6  17  11.52  3.24  2.1  0.074  0.04  1.14  34.78
DNK  Denmark  0.30  0.28  0.94  5  38.12  3.71  31.29  0.162  0.15  0.04  5.17
ECU  Ecuador  2.12*  0.55  0.76  12  8.61  2.71  1.51  0.015  0.06  0.28  10.16
EGY  Egypt  1.17  0.42  0.81  15  14.3  1.99  0.95  0.050  0.06  1  51.76
FIN  Finland  1.26  0.61  0.63  4  59.17  4.19  23.84  0.119  0.11  0.34  4.99
GRC  Greece  1.77  0.5  1.09  13  31.76  2.32  10.62  0.108  0.14  0.13  10.15
HKG  Hong Kong  1.50*  0.19  7.39  6  212.56  2.57  17.98  0.106  0.18  0  5.78
HUN  Hungary  1.36  0.42  1.13  10  13.54  3.75  4.58  0.048  0.13  0.09  10.41
IND  India  1.85  0.46  0.24  10  25.5  1.17  0.33  0.281  0.02  3.29  840.54
IDN  Indonesia  2.23  2.7  0.68  11  18.88  2.27  0.78  0.142  0.02  1.9  177.06
ITA  Italy  1.19  0.34  0.46  11  23.98  4.19  17.3  0.985  0.07  0.3  56.88
JPN  Japan  3.20*  0.73  0.11  11  87.54  3.94  36.34  4.473  0.03  0.38  122.68
IJR  Jordan  2.47*  0.49  2.48  13  66.74  1.33  1.62  0.005  0.34  0.09  3.33
KOR  Korea,  Rep.  2.60*  0.45  0.6  it  40.62  3.94  7.77  0.338  0.07  0.1  42.63
MYS  Malaysia  2.03*  0.43  1.92  6  181.16  2.84  3.29  0.061  0.08  0.33  17.98
MEX  Mexico  5.05  3.16  0.67  15  28.15  2.52  3.27  0.270  0.02  1.96  82.51
NLD  Netherlands  0.99  1  1.57  8  86.98  4.24  23.56  0.353  0.18  0.04  14.94
NZL  New Zealand  0.54  0.94  0.86  3  61.71  3.86  15.47  0.053  0.04  0.27  3.44
NGA  Nigeria  1.52  1.12  2.93  7  6.77  3.05  0.25  0.024  0.04  0.92  95.95
NOR  Norway  1.83  0.86  1.5  6  28.44  3.91  29.64  0.126  0.12  0.32  4.25
PAK  Pakistan  0.90  2  0.62  8  13.94  1.99  0.43  0.048  0.04  0.8  107.41
PAN  Panama  2.92*  0.75  1.95  7  17.93  3.53  2.87  0.007  0.12  0.08  2.38
PER  Peru  5.01*  1.1  0.36  14  13.96  2.37  2.47  0.053  0.04  1.29  21.32
PHL  Philippines  2.43  1.28  0.72  15  50.04  2.66  1.07  0.066  0.04  0.3  61.89
POL  Poland  1.09  4.25  1.02  10  6.29  3.23  3.05  0.115  0.07  0.32  37.71
SEN  Senegal  0.41  0.67  1.23  11  0  2.57  0.56  0.004  0.1  0.2  7.28
SGP  Singapore  1.94*  0.26  4.15  10  145.39  3.91  20.64  0.058  0.24  0  2.71
ESP  Spain  1.14  0.31  0.51  11  38.69  4.04  12.85  0.498  0.06  0.51  38.7
LKA  Sri Lanka  3.22*  0.39  1.45  8  14.8  3.12  0.6  0.010  0.07  0.07  16.88
TUN  Tunisia  0.57  0.51  1.75  13  10.86  1.9  1.88  0.015  0.12  0.16  8.02
TUR  Turkey  2.71  1.13  0.56  11  17.65  1.79  2.53  0.141  0.06  0.77  54.91
GBR  United Kingdom  3.05  1.19  0.69  7  127.17  3.57  17.24  0.994  0.07  0.24  57.57
USA  United States  3.13*  0.94  0.35  4  99.28  4.86  25.03  6.273  0.01  9.36  249.16
URY  Uruguay  2.57  0.81  0.48  9  1.17  2.26  5.16  0.016  0.09  0.18  3.1
VEN  Venezuela  2.71*  0.85  0.72  15  10.68  2.75  3.54  0.068  0.04  0.91  19.29
ZWE  Zimbabwe  1.53  0.44  0.87  6  23.55  2.9  0.67  0.006  0.06  0.39  9.53
Median  1.94  0.73  0.86  10.00  25.50  3.05  3.29  0.07  0.07  0.32  16.88
Mean  2.08  0.97  1.22  9.59  46.15  3.07  9.78  OA21  0.09  1.15  57.74
Note: * denotes the estimated coeffient is significantly greater than one at a 95% confidence level.
lDjankov  et  al. (2000).
2 Ginarte and Park (1995).
3Average  value for the period 1980 to 1999, WDI (2000).
4Assuming  balanced trade, imports share is half of the constructed trade share of Frankel and Romer (1999), Table Al.
34TIble 4: Dependent Variable: Estimated  Average Industry  Markups
OLS  OLS ( HCI)  OLS (HCI)  OLS (HCI)
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NumberofEntryProcedures  0.113**  0.113**  0.092  0.116**
(Entry  Regulation)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.052)
Imports  to Value  Added  in Manufacttring  -0.307*  -0.307**  -0.219*  -0.275**
(Inport Penetration)  (0.165)  (0.117)  (0.124)  (0.107)
Market  Capitalization  0.010**  0.010***  0.008**  0.008**
(Financial  Development)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Intellectual  Property  Protection  Index  0.107  0.107  0.112  0.032
(Institutional  Development)  (0.276)  (0.236)  (0.229)  (0.242)
GDP  per Capita  -0.024  -0.024  -0.038*  -0.028
(Economic  Development)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.023)
Nwnber  of Entry  Procedures  * GDP  0.033**
(0.014)
Imports  Share  * GDP  0.729***
(0.215)
Constant  0.809  0.809  1.007  0.967
(1.059)  (0.857)  (0.890)  (0.857)
R-squared  0.23  0.23  0.27  0.27
#Observations  41  41  41  41
Note: HCI uses the Hinkley-White  hetroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix for finite sample.
*, **, **  indicate significance  at 90%, 95% and 990K  confidence levels  respectively.
35Table 5: Dependent Variable: Estimated  Average Industry Markups
OLS  (HC3) OLS  (Bootstrap)  FGLS  IV  (HCI)
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NumberofEntryProcedures  0.113*  0.113**  0.103**  0.108*
(Entry  Regulation)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.054)
Imports  to Value  Added  in Manufacturing  -0.307*  -0.307**  -0.298*  -0.672***
(Import  Penetration)  (0.154)  (0.181)  (0.160)  (0.242)
Market  Capitalization  0.010*  0.010**  0.01 0**  0.016**
(Financial  Development)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)
Intellectual  Property  Protection  Index  0.107  0.107  0.116  0.023
(Institutional  Development)  (0.254)  (0.249)  (0.268)  (0.277)
GDP  per Capita  -0.024  -0.024  -0.025  -0.029
(Economic  Development)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024)
Constant  0.809  0.809  0.884  1.333
(0.918)  (0.893)  (1.033)  (0.961)
R-squared  0.2:3  0.23  0.22  0.13
# Observations  41  41  41  41
Note:  HC3  uses  the  Davidson-Mackinnon  covariance  matrix,  which  is an approximation  to the  jackknife  estimator.
HCI uses the Hinkley-White  heteroscedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix for finite sample.
Confidence  intervals in the bootstrap estimation are bias-corrected.
In the IV regression, imports share is instrumented  by Frankel-Romer  trade share, surface area and population.
*, **,  **  indicate significance at 90%/o,  95% and 99%  confidence  levels  respectively.
Table 6: Specification Tests
F-Statistics  d.f£  p-value
(1)  Ho : no omitted variables  2.08  3, 32  0.1223
(2)  Ho: no model mis-specification  1.88  1, 38  0.1788
36Table 7: Dependent Variable: M2
OLS  OLS
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)
Estimated Markup  0.149***
(0.025)
Number of Entry Procedures  0.049***
(0.008)
Imports to Value Added in Manufacturing  -0.069***
(Trade openness)  (0.017)
Market Capitalization  0.003***
(Financial  Development)  (0.000)
Intellectual Property Protection Index  0.125***
(Institutional  Development)  (0.021)
GDP per Capita  -0.004***
(Economic  Development)  (0.001)
Country Dummies  YES  YES
Industry Dummies  YES  YES
Year Dunmmies  YES  YES
Constant  1.061  1.700***
(1.185)  (0.323)
R-squared  0.02  0.10
# Observations  14646  12385
Note: Country cluster adjusted White standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *'  indicate significance  at 90%/ 0, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively.
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